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WASHINGTON CASE LAW

motive behind that conduct exceeds the limits or social standards of
acceptability that the court will find a "willful wrong." "Willful," then,
is used to describe conduct or motive which is permeated with a sense of
maliciousness, recklessness or wantonness-that which the actor knows
or should know is unacceptable.
In allowing recovery for the intentional infliction of emotional injury,
Washington case authority appears to be in full accord with the present
trend of American jurisdictions." Apparently Washington now has
two causes of action in tort for an intentional infliction of emotional
injury unaccompanied by any physical violence. One action is based
upon the outrageous nature of the act producing only an emotional
disturbance. The other is based upon the nature of the actor's motive
or purpose in the performance of an intentional act. A malicious motive
solely intended to cause severe emotional distress may result in conduct
which exceeds the bounds of reasonableness. Yet, as indicated in the
comparison between the Gadbury and Christensen cases, this is not
always the case. Therefore, it is submitted that recognition of "wrongful" motive as well as outrageous conduct as separate causes of action
gives the injured party a broader remedy for the intentional infliction
of emotional distress.
GUST S. DocEs
Intersection Collisions-Deception. The invitation to litigation
issued by the Washington court when it decided Martin v. Hadenfeldt2
in 1930 was again accepted by counsel in Chavers v. Olad.
David Ohad was driving his father's car along an arterial in Yakima
about 2:00 in the morning. Mrs. Chavers stopped before entering the
arterial, looked up the street and saw David about one block away,
thought that she could pull out and make a left turn onto the arterial,
and began doing so. The two cars collided in the intersection.
Mrs. Chavers recovered a judgment based on a verdict in her favor
in the Superior court of Yakima county, but that judgment was reversed by the Washington Supreme Court. Judge Weaver noted that
the case was controlled by a Yakima right-of-way ordinance,' and
20

See note 1 miupra and the discussion in note 14 supra.

1 157 Wash. 563, 289 Pac. 533 (1930).

For an extensive discussion of the case, see
Comment, 26 WAsn. L. REV. 30 (1951).
2 59 Wn.2d 646, 369 P.2d 831 (1962).
8 The ordinance is substantially the same as RCW 46.60.170. ("The operator of a
vehicle entering upon an arterial highway, road, street, alley, way or driveway, shall
come to a complete stop at the entrance of such arterial highway, and having stopped
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that the rules laid down in the Hadenfeldt case govern the interpretation of such ordinances and of similar state statutes. The court held
that the plaintiff, Mrs. Chavers, had not disproved the contributory
negligence presumptively established by her violation of the ordinance
by producing evidence sufficient to meet the requirements of rule 4 of
the Hadenfeldt case,4 the "deceit exception." The only evidence of the
speed of the defendant's car was her opinion that the speed must have
been "terrific" because of the force of the impact, and her previous
estimate that the car had been "far enough" away from the intersection
at the last time she had looked.
The implication of the majority opinion is that if the plaintiff could
have proved that the defendant's speed was excessive, she would have
succeeded in establishing deception by the defendant, thereby overcoming the presumption of contributory negligence. Judge Rosellini
concurs specially, taking issue with this implication. He says that,
"A disfavored driver should not be heard to say that speed, except in
a change of pace situation, has deceived him and caused him to make
a false determination that he had a margin of safety in clearing an
intersection."' As will be seen, he states what he thinks the law should
be, not what it has been.
There are many cases which indicate that the speed of the favored
driver can deceive the disfavored driver. Martin v. Hadenjeldt," announced the rule that a disfavored driver would be exonerated from
blame if he brought forth proof that he had been deceived by the
wrongful, negligent, or unlawful operation of the car driven by the
favored driver. There the court volunteered an illustration to explain
what was meant. The rule would apply, the court said, where a disfavored driver observes a car approaching on his right but cannot
accurately judge its speed. If he then enters the intersection after
having made such observations as would a reasonably prudent man,
he will not be held negligent. In the year following the Hadenfeldt
shall look out for and give right of way to any vehicles upon the arterial highway
simultaneously approaching a given point within the intersection, whether or not his
vehicle first reaches and enters the intersection; . . .") 59 Wn.2d at 649, 369 P.2d at
833.
4 The court held that where there is a collision within an intersection the cars are
deemed to have been approaching simultaneously unless the following exception
applies: "(4) The driver on the left assumes and meets the burden of producing evidence which will carry to the jury the question of fact as to whether or not [sic] the
favored driver on the right so wrongfully, negligently, or unlawfully operated his car
as would deceive a reasonably prudent driver on the left and warrant him in going
forward upon the assumption that he had the right to proceed." 157 Wash. at 567, 289
Pac. at 535 (1930).
559 Wn.2d 646, 655, 369 P.2d 831, 836 (1962).
6 157 Wash. 563, 289 Pac. 533 (1930).
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case the rule was applied to facts almost identical to those used in the
illustration. In Martin v. Westinghouse' a disfavored driver saw the
car of the favored driver approaching, thought it was far enough away,
and entered the intersection where the collision occurred. Holding that
speed could indeed be deceptive, the court affirmed a judgment for
the disfavored driver.
Later cases are in accord. In Gavin v. Everton8 where a disfavored
driver defended in a suit brought by a favored driver on the grounds
that he had been deceived by the speed of the favored driver, the court
held that it was not error to give the issue of the defendant's deception
to the jury. In Plenderlieth v. McGuire9 Judge Hill extensively reviews
the history of the application of rule 4 of the Hadenfeldt case, and
concludes that on the question of whether the speed of the favored
driver can be deceptive the law is that:
A driver of an automobile upon the public highways has a right to
assume that other drivers thereon will drive and operate their automobiles in compliance with the laws existing at the time and place of
their operation, and that drivers upon the highways have the right to
rely upon this assumption until they know or, by the exercise of ordinary care, should know to the contrary. In other words, if a disfavored
driver is entitled to and does rely on that assumption and the favored
driver is in fact exceeding the speed limit, the disfavored driver is
deceived.10
The most recent case holding that speed can be deceptive is Fazio v.
Eglitis.1 There a suit by a disfavored driver who claimed to have been
deceived by the speed of the favored driver was dismissed by the lower
court for insufficiency of the plaintiff's evidence. The court reversed
the judgment for the defendant, holding it error not to have submitted
the issue of the plaintiff's deception to the jury.
There are, however, certain limitations upon the ability of the disfavored driver to claim deception because of speed. He must have
seen the favored driver, he must not have known that the favored
driver was exceeding the speed limit, and he must not have known
exactly how fast the favored driver was traveling.
Until recently the cases have consistently held that a disfavored
driver cannot be deceived if he does not see the car driven by the fav7 162 Wash. 150, 297 Pac. 1098 (1931).
8 19 Wn.2d 785, 144 P.2d 735 (1944).
0 27 Wn2d 841, 180 P.2d 808 (1947).
10 Id. at 849, 180 P2d at 811-812.
11 54 Wn2d 699, 344 P.2d 521 (1959).
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ored driver. 2 However, from the recent case ofBockstruck v. Jones,"
it now appears that a favored driver can deceive a disfavored driver
merely by being unseen. According to Judge Hill, "a disfavored driver
who properly looks to the right, can be deceived by a clear stretch
of road as well as by the deceptive manner in which a favored driver
operates his vehicle."1 4 It is submitted that this is an improper use
of the concept of deception. One who sees a clear stretch of road is
not deceived, in any common sense use of the term, if there happens
to be a speeding driver who is beyond his vision when he looks; he
merely acts reasonably in entering the intersection, since the nonexistence of traffic clearly gives him a reasonable margin of safety. 5
The disfavored driver must see the favored driver, but he must not
know that the favored driver is exceeding the speed limit, or he will
lose his case. So held the court in Plenderlieth v. McGuire, 6 where it
says, "whosoever is deceived soley by the admittedly excessive and
unincreased speed of an approaching vehicle upon his right, is not a
reasonably prudent and cautious man.""
Not only does a disfavored driver lose if he knew the favored driver
was speeding, but he also loses if he was too accurate in his observations. In Billingsley v. Rovig-Temple Co.' a judgment for a disfavored
driver was reversed because,
The respondent was well aware of the exact locations of the two cars,
their relative distances from the common point toward which they
were both moving, the relative speeds at which they were traveling,
and the continuity of speed maintained by each.' 9
12In
Hauswirth v. Pom-Arleau, 11 Wn.2d 354, 371, 119 P.2d. 674, 683 (1941), the
court said, "Richard Hauswirth never saw the Pom-Arleau car at all; he therefore
could not have been deceived by its wrongful operation." Accord, Wilkinson v. Martin,
56 Wn.2d 921, 349 P.2d 608 (1960) ; King v. Mothan, 54 Wn.2d 115, 338 P.2d 338
(1959) ; Zorich v. Billingsley, 52 Wn.2d 138, 324 P.2d 255 (1958) ; Smith v. Laughlin,
51 Wn.2d 740, 321 P.2d 907 (1958) ; Thompson v. City of Seattle, 42 Wn.2d 53, 253
P.2d 625 (1953) ; Shultes v. Halpin, 33 Wn.2d 294, 205 P.2d 1201 (1949) ; Boyle v.
Lewis, 30 Wn.2d 665, 193 P.2d 332 (1948).
13 160 Wash. Dec. 679, 374 P.2d 996 (1962).
14 Id. at 682, 374 P.2d at 998.
15 For a discussion of "reasonable margin of safety" in its application to intersection
cases, see Comment, 26 WASH. L. REv. 30 (1951). For application of the same concept
in a situation where the favored driver was exceeding the speed limit and the disfavored driver recovers, but the court does not mention deception, see Huber v. Hemrich Brewing Co., 188 Wash. 235, 62 P.2d 451 (1936) ; Brum v. Hammermeister, 169
Wash. 659, 14 P.2d 700 (1932); McIntyre v. Erickson, 168 Wash. 355, 12 P.2d 399
(1932).
1"27 Wn.2d 841, 180 P.2d 808 (1947).
1Id. at 850, 180 P.2d at 812. See Bell v. Bennett, 56 Wn.2d 780, 355 P.2d 331
(1960), where the court said that if the disfavored driver knew that the favored driver
was speeding, his duty to yield the right of way would be intensified rather than diminished. See Saad v. Longworthy, 153 Wash. 598, 280 Pac. 74 (1929).
18 16 Wn.2d 202, 133 P.2d 265 (1943).
19 Id. at 210, 133 P.2d at 268.

1963]

WASHINGTON CASE LAW

The same fate befell a disfavored driver who was cross-complaining
in Cramer v. Bock 2 ° because, "her own testimony is that she noticed
its speed from the time she saw it to her right and was at all times
acquainted with its speed as it approached the intersection."'"
The present state of the law is that a disfavored driver may be deceived by the speed at which a favored driver is approaching, but not
if he is a good judge of speed or knows that the other's speed is excessive. The law as it now stands puts a premium upon bad judgment
and careless observation. Carelessness frees a disfavored driver from
contributory negligence instead of charging him with it. It seems more
reasonable to follow Judge Rosellini's suggestion that a disfavored
driver should never be allowed to claim that he was deceived solely by
the speed of the favored driver.
ROBERT L. BEALE

Interspousal Immunity-The Effects of Community Property and
Fraud. The Washington position on interspousal tort immunity should
be reconsidered in view of two recent California decisions, Self v. Self,,
and Klein v. Klein.'
The Self case involved an assault by a husband upon his wife while
the couple were living together. The court overruled its longstanding
immunity doctrine3 and allowed the wife to recover.
Having created its own authority in Self, the court proceeded to decide the companion case, Klein, which was a negligence action by a
wife against her husband. By washing the exterior deck of his pleasure
boat with water, he made a slippery and unsafe walking surface upon
which his wife fell while she was helping him to clean the boat. Here,
too, the marital relationship existed at the time of the tort.
Washington's position on interspousal immunity as compared to the
California court's complete abrogation of immunity is illustrated by
Goode v. Martinis,' in which the husband, during the interim between
commencement and completion of divorce and while the couple were
legally separated, revisited the wife and sexually assaulted her. The
Washington court indicated by the tenor of its language that it may be
20 21

Wn.2d 13, 149 P.2d 525 (1944).

21 Id.at 16, 149 P2d at 527. Accord, Pasero v. Tacoma Transit Co., 35 Wn.2d 97,

211 P.2d 160 (1949) ; Jamieson v. Taylor, 1 Wn.2d 217, 95 P2d 791 (1939).
126 Cal. Rptr. 97, 376 P2d 65 (1962).
226 Cal. Rptr. 102, 376 P.2d 70 (1962).
3 Peters v. Peters, 156 Cal. 32, 103 Pac. 219 (1909).
4 58 Wn.2d 229, 361 P2d 941 (1961), 37 WASH. L. REv. 233 (1962).

